



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/69
31 January 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Botswana, Chile, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras
and Indonesia: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Deeply disturbed by the world-wide persistence of acts of international terrorism in all its forms which endanger or take innocent lives, have a deleterious effect on international relations and jeopardize the security of States,

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (S/23500) when the Council met at the level of Heads of State and Government in which the members of the Council expressed their deep concern over acts of international terrorism and emphasized the need for the international community to deal effectively with all such acts,

Recalling also the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature at New York on 14 December 1973,

Stressing the imperative need to strengthen international cooperation between States in order to make and adopt practical and effective measures to prevent, combat and eliminate all forms of terrorism that affect the international community as a whole,

Convinced that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States are involved, is an essential element for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Gravely alarmed at the terrorist assassination attempt on the life of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995, and convinced that those responsible for that act must be brought to justice,

Taking note that the Third Extraordinary Session of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of 11 September 1995, considered that attack as aimed, not only at the President



of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and not only at the sovereignty, integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also at Africa as a whole,

Taking note also of the statements of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism of 11 September 1995 and of 19 December 1995 and supporting the implementation of the requests contained therein,

Regretting the fact that the Government of the Sudan has not yet complied with the requests of the Central Organ of the OAU set out in those statements,

Noting the letter from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia of 9 January 1996 (S/1996/10) to the President of the Security Council,

Noting also the letters from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan of 11 January 1996 (S/1996/22) and 12 January 1996 (S/1996/25) to the President of the Council,

1. Condemns the terrorist assassination attempt on the life of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995;

2. Strongly deplores the flagrant violation of the sovereignty and integrity of Ethiopia and the attempt to disturb the peace and security of Ethiopia and the region as a whole;

3. Commends the efforts of the Government of Ethiopia to resolve this issue through bilateral and regional arrangements;

4. Calls upon the Government of the Sudan to comply with the requests of the Organization of African Unity without further delay to:

(a) Undertake immediate action to extradite to Ethiopia for prosecution the three suspects sheltering in the Sudan and wanted in connection with the assassination attempt on the basis of the 1964 Extradition Treaty between Ethiopia and the Sudan;

(b) Desist from engaging in activities of assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuaries to terrorist elements and act in its relations with its neighbours and with others in full conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and with the Charter of the Organization of African Unity;

5. Urges the international community to encourage the Government of the Sudan to respond fully and effectively to the OAU requests;

6. Welcomes the efforts of the Secretary-General of the OAU aimed at the implementation of the relevant provisions of the statements of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism of 11 September 1995 and of 19 December 1995, and supports the OAU in its continued efforts to implement its decisions;

7. Requests the Secretary-General in consultation with the OAU to seek the cooperation of the Government of the Sudan in the implementation of this resolution and to report to the Council within 60 days;

8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/70
31 January 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1037 (1996) of 15 January 1996 establishing the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES),

Having considered the Secretary-General's letter of 26 January 1996 to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/66),

1. Decides to authorize, as part of UNTAES, and in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1037 (1996), the deployment of 100 military observers for a period of six months;
 2. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/869
S/1996/71
30 January 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 10
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON
THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 18 January 1996 from the Permanent Representative of
France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Following the issuance of your Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (A/50/60-S/1995/1), the President of the Security Council, in his statement of 22 February 1995, invited Member States to present further reflections on United Nations operations in the area of international peace and security.

Attached is France's contribution to the consideration of this important question (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under the item entitled "Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization", and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alain DEJAMMET



ANNEX

Supplement to An Agenda for Peace

Aide-mémoire by France

France welcomed the issuance on 3 January 1995 of the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It believes that this report, which takes into account the experience acquired over the past two years, makes a valuable contribution to the discussion on this subject.

Pursuant to the invitation extended by the President of the Security Council in his statement of 22 February 1995, and by way of supplementing the aide-mémoire issued by France following the publication of An Agenda for Peace, the French Government wishes to present the following reflections on United Nations operations in the area of international peace and security.

I. A DETAILED LOOK AT THE NATURE OF PEACEMAKING
AND CONFLICT-MODERATION OPERATIONS

In his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, speaking in the context of United Nations operations in the area of international peace and security, draws a distinction between preventive diplomacy and deployment, peacemaking (by diplomatic means), peace-keeping (stricto sensu), post-conflict peace-building (chiefly through disarmament of the parties and restoration of political and economic structures and the social fabric) and enforcement action.

France fully endorses this list of categories. However, it would propose adding to the list in order to reflect more accurately the nature of operations that are deployed before a conflict has ended and are intended to restore peace or moderate the conflict by methods that involve both securing the parties' consent (principally through negotiation) and constraint (to ensure that safe areas or the free movement of humanitarian convoys are respected, for example).

The usefulness of such a category, of which Operation Turquoise in Rwanda is one example, leads us to stress the following points.

The fundamental difference between operations of this type and conventional peace-keeping operations is that the former are undertaken before the conflict has ended or while it is in its final stages, which means that at least one of the parties believes that its interests are best served by a prolongation, rather than an ending, of the conflict. An operation aimed at ending the conflict cannot, therefore, be neutral, any more than can one aimed at moderating the conflict, for the latter seeks of necessity to modify the behaviour of at least one of the adversaries, which in most cases means simply preventing it from using whatever strategies or tactics it considers most appropriate (by creating safe areas, banning the overflight of certain areas, or organizing the return of refugees, for example).

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It is clear from the outset that, by thwarting the plans of one or more parties to the conflict, such operations are unlikely to enjoy the parties' consent. This can only be obtained gradually, through negotiation but also by assistance to the population (medical assistance, civil engineering and so forth); at the same time, the operation must be prepared to use force to impose conditions that are not yet accepted, beginning, perhaps, with the very presence of United Nations troops. The decision to launch such operations must therefore be based on Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The deployment of troops as well as the protective and combat equipment they require must be planned for in a manner that will permit the use of force.

Thus operations of this type contain the risk of escalation, which, if not overcome, can change the nature of an operation, making it a coercive military action (peace enforcement). Such a development must not be ruled out on principle; however, the political cost (particularly the withdrawal of certain contingents) and the technical difficulties (change in military deployment) must be reckoned. Accordingly, peacemaking and conflict-moderation missions must be extremely disciplined and skilled when they use force; above all, they must enjoy, to the extent possible, undisputed military superiority.

Given that the Organization's military resources are limited, it follows that the number of such operations cannot be greatly increased: the decision rests, and must rest, with the Security Council.

Having their basis in the power of intimidation but equally in the effort to secure consent, such operations must be neutral rather than impartial. The terms of their mandate may thwart the military goals or methods of one party more than those of the other, yet the United Nations force must ensure that these terms are equally respected by all: the force must remain an arbitrator and must ensure that it is perceived as such.

Such operations are highly sensitive and must be carried out by troops that are well prepared. Combat training and a knowledge of the operation environment are vital to such preparation. However, basic training must be supplemented by training in negotiating techniques so that the force, and senior personnel in particular, are really equipped to deal with a number of different authorities.

II. ENHANCEMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION'S RAPID REACTION CAPACITY

The current timetable for mounting a United Nations force is often too long. The most typical example is UNAMIR II, which could not be deployed until six months after its creation by a Security Council resolution. France suggests that this situation be improved by actually implementing and refining the system of stand-by arrangements and by establishing rapid deployment units within this system.

A. Implementation and refinement of the system of stand-by arrangements

The system of stand-by arrangements, which was put in place in 1994, is not yet fully operational, for its effectiveness depends on the speed with which the United Nations Secretariat can use it to mount a cohesive force suited to the operation in question, and thus on the accuracy of the data available to it. The Secretariat, therefore, should continue to encourage States to become part of this system while also requesting States that are already participants to make their offers more specific by submitting detailed volumetric descriptions of the resources proposed. Such descriptions should also mention the timetable for the deployment of each unit (so as to avoid, for example, having a combat unit arrive in the theatre of operations far in advance of the necessary support units).

In addition, it is difficult to create a viable command structure in a vacuum: it would therefore be desirable for countries having the capacity to do so to propose command units comprising a general staff to which officers from other contributor States would be assigned. France can have units of this type standing on four days' notice; some unit members could also help to staff the Situation Centre in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

B. Establishment of rapid deployment units

Such measures, however, may not be sufficient; the system of stand-by arrangements is designed to allow for deployment within two months, which is too long in cases where any delay will aggravate the situation on the ground and reduce the chances for carrying out a successful operation.

In this light, the French Government feels that the proposal concerning the establishment of a rapid reaction force put forward by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report entitled "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" is of particular interest. France is aware, however, of the political and technical difficulties such a project would encounter, and it therefore proposes that rapid deployment units should be set up within the system of stand-by arrangements. The first characteristic of these units is that it would take only a short time to deploy them, ranging from two to 10 days. The concern for effectiveness in implementing such a system also requires that the proposed troops, together with their protective and combat equipment, be of high quality, that the command structures be pre-planned and that the exercises, which could be carried out at the general staff level and, on the ground, through troop mobilization manoeuvres, be organized jointly by the United Nations and by States that have offered to contribute rapid deployment units.

At the meeting held by the Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992, France had announced that it was prepared to contribute to the United Nations, within less than two weeks, up to two contingents of 1,000 troops each. In the context of this commitment, it now announces that it will soon submit a report to the Secretariat describing these units in detail.

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III. STRENGTHENING THE MILITARY STAFF CAPACITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Despite the considerable efforts made by the United Nations Secretariat to improve the services concerned, including the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, the effectiveness of United Nations operations is still being limited by the inadequacy of the Organization's military staff capacities in the areas of both planning and command, and the most pressing need appears to concern the definition of military operations in fulfilment of the mandate established by the Security Council. These capacities should be reinforced by increasing the resources of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and setting up specific teams for each operation.

A. Development of planning capacities

In order to be fully effective, military planning must set as its goal not only to enforce political decisions (the Council's mandate) but also to help to prepare them.

It is therefore desirable to continue to develop an early operational planning capacity in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations. To strengthen the effectiveness of such planning, it would be useful to envisage the elaboration of deployment scenarios as soon as a crisis develops which is likely to lead to a United Nations operation.

France envisions the systematic deployment on the ground, from the time when an operation begins to be seriously considered, of a team composed of members of the Planning Cell of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and of a planning element comprised of a unit that would be furnished by a country to show its particular interest in the operation. This team would help those who would be in charge of the force, namely, the future Special Representative of the Secretary-General and, where possible, the future military commander of the operation. The team would formulate a concept of operations which would be annexed to the report submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council and would help to clarify the Council's debates.

In this context, the Government of France is contributing to the United Nations a planning unit which can be deployed within 48 hours.

Once the resolution establishing an operation has been adopted, this unit, which may be reinforced as needed by future commanders of the main national detachments, would ensure the overall military planning of the operation by preparing, in particular, a detailed military directive and the initial order of operations.

Finally, after the operation has been set up, it would normally be the responsibility of the Planning Cell of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations to adapt the operation to the changing military and political situation, a task which could involve the preparation and translation into military terms of new Security Council resolutions modifying the initial mandate, up to the planning of withdrawal. It may well be necessary, however,

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in the case of large and complex operations, to have further recourse to a planning unit.

In the event that rapid deployment units are to be used, this team will be reinforced where necessary, in order to plan the deployment of these units, by the commanders of national contingents that have been contributed to the United Nations in this context or by other officers representing contributor States.

B. Improvement of command structures

The establishment of an effective planning system should, in itself, improve the command of the force.

It is important, none the less, to strengthen the effectiveness of command staffs, especially for the largest and most delicate missions, by establishing them more quickly and limiting their necessary heterogeneity. This is the reasoning behind our proposal for command units (see II.A. above), which would be particularly useful in cases where rapid deployment units are used.

The Situation Centre within the Department of Peace-keeping Operations should continue to be strengthened. France proposes that the staff of this centre be reinforced by representatives of States contributing to an operation, at their request, and this would make it possible at the same time to give these States more rapid and precise information about the evolution of the situation on the ground and to improve the Secretariat's follow-up capabilities.

It would be helpful to specify the nature of the authority of the force commander (and, ultimately, the Secretary-General) over national units. France feels that this authority should be closely akin to operational control. The rules of engagement for each force should also be clearly spelt out.

Lastly, the many incidents and difficulties that have occurred have shown how important it is to harmonize the action of the civilian component with that of the military component of the operations, avoiding both overlapping and a too rigid separation of duties (where the civilian component would be, in particular, solely in charge of administrative duties and negotiation).

The desirable command structure obviously depends on the nature of the missions to be accomplished. Experience seems to recommend, however, on the one hand, the systematic designation, for all operations of whatever size, of a special representative of the Secretary-General having complete authority over the various components of the operation and, on the other hand, at least for peacemaking and conflict-moderation operations, which almost inextricably link military tasks (even including combat) with negotiation and humanitarian aid activities, an integrated structure involving close cooperation between civilians and military personnel at all levels of command, including logistics.

* * *

In conclusion, France is aware that the success of United Nations operations in the area of international peace and security is also based in

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large part on the quality of the troops engaged in these interventions. It supports the training programme for mobile peace-keeping training teams, in which it intends to participate actively by assigning French officers to these teams and hosting training courses in France. It is also prepared to open its specialized training centres to foreign trainees and to help States at their request to establish national training centres in liaison with the competent United Nations bodies.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/72
30 January 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 1996 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
RESOLUTION 985 (1995) CONCERNING LIBERIA ADDRESSED TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 985 (1995) concerning Liberia containing an account of the Committee's activities since its establishment until 31 December 1995. The present report, which was adopted by the Committee under the no-objection procedure on 26 January 1996, is being submitted in accordance with the note by the President of the Security Council of 29 March 1995 (S/1995/234).

(Signed) Gerardo MARTÍNEZ BLANCO
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 985 (1995)
concerning Liberia

Annex

Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant
to resolution 985 (1995) concerning Liberia

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 788 (1992) of 19 November 1992, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia.

2. On 13 April 1995, the Security Council, in paragraph 4 of its resolution 985 (1995), established a committee consisting of all members of the Council to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) To seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the embargo imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 788 (1992);

(b) To consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the embargo, and in that context to make recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo;

(c) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 788 (1992) and to provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States.

3. The Committee's bureau, as elected at its first meeting of each year, consists of a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen. The Chairman is elected in his/her personal capacity for the calendar year. For 1995, the bureau consisted of Ambassador Gerardo Martínez Blanco (Honduras) as Chairman, with the delegations of Indonesia and Italy providing the two Vice-Chairmen.

4. The Committee adopted the present report under the no-objection procedure on 26 January 1996. The purpose of the report is to present a factual summary of the Committee's activities since its establishment in 1993 until 31 December 1995, during which time it held two meetings.

II. SUMMARY OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE DURING
THE REPORTING PERIOD

5. At its 2nd meeting, held on 25 May 1995, the Committee considered and adopted the guidelines for the conduct of its work, which were transmitted to all States and international organizations on 7 June 1995. In addition, an appeal was also addressed on the same day, by means of a press release, to governmental or non-governmental organizations as well as individuals for any

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information they might have on violations or suspected violations of the embargo imposed against Liberia (United Nations press release SC/6049).

6. During the period under review, the Committee did not receive from Member States any reports on alleged violations of the arms embargo.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/73
31 January 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 31 JANUARY 1996 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO
THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter from the Secretary of the
General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document
of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ali Sunni MUNTASSER
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



Annex

Letter dated 27 January 1996 from the Secretary of the General
People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International
Cooperation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed to the
President of the Security Council

I wish to refer to my letter dated 27 July 1995, addressed to the President of the Security Council, which was circulated as a document of the Security Council (S/1995/624). I should like to inform you that the United States Administration, in a letter which it sent to the United States Congress on 22 January 1996 concerning the national state of emergency with respect to Libya, has once again repeated its claims that the policies and actions of the Government of Libya continue to pose an abnormal threat to the national security and foreign policies of the United States of America, and that the Libyan Government's persistent failure to appropriately demonstrate its renunciation of terrorism, and particularly its continuing failure to comply fully and effectively with the decisions and demands of Security Council resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992), constitute a threat to international peace and security. In its letter, the United States Administration threatened to impose international measures more severe than those included in Security Council resolution 883 (1993), including a comprehensive petroleum embargo.

The General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation would like to stress that the claims the United States Administration has persisted in repeating, ever since the state of emergency was declared on 17 January 1986 by Executive Order No. 12543 and economic sanctions were imposed on Libya in accordance with it, are false and have no factual basis of any kind.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is a peaceful country bound by the principles of international law and by the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It works in cooperation with the international community in order to maintain international peace and security and strengthen the other purposes of the United Nations. It endeavours to settle its disputes with other countries by peaceful means, as witnessed by its good record with the International Court of Justice, which is not restricted to simply having recourse to the Court, but is affirmed by its complete compliance with the judgements passed by the Court.

The General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation would also like to stress that there is nothing in any Libyan policy or action which could possibly constitute a threat to American national security or foreign policy. It is, on the contrary, completely unimaginable that those policies and actions could threaten American national security, and it is ridiculous to suggest otherwise. The truth is, as the facts attest and events corroborate, that it is the policies of the United States Administration and its actions which have posed a very real threat during recent years to the national security of Libya. What was the iniquitous United States armed aggression against Libya in 1986 but a sombre illustration of those policies and actions?

Despite those empty claims, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has always been concerned to demonstrate its readiness to discuss any problem or dispute in order to settle it by one of the peaceful means advocated by the Charter of the United Nations. It has, in effect, ever since the legal dispute concerning the Lockerbie affair arose, called upon the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom to open the door to dialogue, in order to arrive at a peaceful settlement. However, they persist in keeping any door which could lead to a peaceful solution closed. They have preferred to escalate the situation and to repeat their empty claims and misleading statements, in order to prolong and increase the severity of the sanctions. They are unconcerned about the suffering caused to the Arab people of Libya and the people of the region by the harshness of these sanctions.

The United States Administration's claim that Security Council resolution 731 (1992) has not been complied with is also unfounded. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has complied fully and effectively with that resolution. The statement by the United Kingdom Government to the Security Council on 22 November 1995 provides confirmation: it described the response to its questions concerning the Irish Republican Army as a positive step towards compliance with the pertinent resolutions and, in particular, towards the renunciation of terrorism. All that remains is the trial of the two suspects, and extraordinary efforts have been made by Libya and its associated regional organizations to find a possible legal solution. It is not possible to enumerate here all those efforts, which have been faithfully reflected in Security Council documents.

It is sufficient, in response to the United States Administration's claim concerning terrorism, that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has challenged the three Western countries to accept its suggestion that a delegation should be sent to ascertain that there are no camps used, as it is claimed, for the training of terrorists on Libyan territory. All this is well established by Security Council records.

The United States Administration continues to repeat false claims and statements in order to mislead public opinion, influence the Security Council and keep holding the sharp sword of sanctions over the Arab Libyan people without any justification. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya therefore officially requests the Security Council as follows:

1. To organize a committee to study the facts and the extent of the truth of the claims made by the United States Administration that Libyan policies and actions pose an abnormal threat to the national security and foreign policies of the United States of America.

2. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya repeats yet again its willingness to receive a delegation chosen by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to ascertain that there are no camps used, as it is claimed, for the training of terrorists on Libyan territory. The Jamahiriya hopes that the Security Council will call upon the Secretary-General to send such a delegation as soon as possible. Similarly, it hopes that the Security Council will call upon the three States to stop repeating general and ambiguous expressions which are damaging to the reputation of a Member of the United Nations.

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3. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya reiterates its demand that an independent inquiry should be conducted to arrive at the truth of the incident which caused the Pan American aircraft to be destroyed over Lockerbie, in view of the inadequacy of previous investigations and the doubts surrounding them. It also demands the suspension of the sanctions imposed by Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) until the results of the investigation are published.

If these requests are carried out, they will put an end to the false claims being repeated from time to time, which are badly damaging international relations.

(Signed) Omar Mustafa MUNTASSER
Secretary of the General People's Committee
for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation
